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Thispaper develops a stochastic equilibrium model of an open
economy incorporating speculation in the forward exchange market. The
model is used to examine two issues. The first is the role of specu-
lation in stabilizing the economy against stochastic disturbances.
Much risk averse speculation stabilizes domestic income against
disturbances in the domestic bond market and forward exchange market
but exacerbates the effect of foreign disturbances. Speculation may
dampen or augment the effect of money market and output supply dis-
turbances depending upon the share of foreign bonds in total wealth
and the interest elasticity of bond demand. The second issue that the
model addresses is the role of the forward market in stabilization
policy. Forward market intervention (or its equivalent in this model,
sterilized spot market intervention) does not provide monetary
authorities additional leverage in stabilizing income beyond unsteril-
ized spot market intervention. Intervention rules based on reactions
to both the forward and the spot exchange rates, however, can outper-
form intervention policies responding to the spot rate alone,
regardless of the market in which intervention occurs.
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On several occasions economists have argued that intervention
in the forward market for foreign exchange can provide central banks
with an additional means of achieving their policy objectives. In a
Treatise on Money, Keynes (1930) proposed that intervention take place
on three fronts: "I conceive of (Central Banks) as fixing week by week
not only their official rate of discount, but also the terms on which
they are prepared to buy or sell forward exchange on one or two leading
foreign exchange centres and the terms on which they are prepared to
buy or sell gold points." (Page 327). Much more recently, Spraos (1959)
argued that "the forward rate should not only be supported, as a defense
against speculative attack, but should be actually pegged." (Page 21).
Both Keynes and Spraos formulated their proposals for central
bank intervention in the forward market under the assumption that the spot
rate is fixed, or at least maintained within bands. With the advent of
increased flexibility of the spot exchange rate after the demise of the
gold standard and Bretton Woods, forward exchange markets have become a
much more important phenomenon, with markets existing between most major
currencies. But despite this development and Keynes' early recognition
of the role of forward market intervention, and despite some experiments
with forward market intervention by the Bank of England and the Deutsches
Bundesbank (see Spraos (1959) and Day (1976)),there has been little
subsequent discussion about the desirability of forward market interven-
tion or the formulation of optimal intervention rules in the forward
market
By contrast, there has been considerable discussion about the
optimal management of the spot exchange rate via intervention in the spot—2—
market. Most of the literature has addressed this issue in termsofthe
choice between perfectly fixed and perfectly flexible exchange rates. How-
ever, recently, several authors have treated the degree of intervention as
a policy parameter and have derived optimal intervention rules in stochastic
open economy models; see, e.g., Boyer (1978), Buiter (1979), Bilson (1978),
Roper and Turnovsky (1980), Turnovsky (1983), Buiter and Eaton (l980).'
In this paper we develop a stochastic macroeconomic model of a
small, open economy which incorporates both a spot and a forward market in
foreign exchange.1 An important parameter linking the forward and spot rates
is the elasticity of the aggregative speculative position with respect to
the differential between the forward and expected future spot rate. The
common procedure adopted in the literature of equating the forward rate to
the expected future spot rate is equivalent to assuming that this elasticity
is infinite and hence emerges as a special case of our analysis.
We use the model to focus on two issues. First, we consider the
effects of private speculation through the forward market on the stability
of the domestic economy in the absence of any intervention. This issue of
whether or not speculative capital flows are stabilizing is an old one and
was central to the early debates on fixed versus flexible rates. It has,
however, been neglected in the more recent formal analyses of exchange markets.
We find that the effect of more elastic speculation is to provide greater
insulation for the domestic price level from speculative disturbances; but
to increase its sensitivity to foreign disturbances. The effect of more elastic
speculation on the sensitivity of the price level to domestic output supply and
money demand shocks depends upon the share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth
and the interest elasticity of bond demand with respect to the real interest rate.
When domestic bonds are a small component of total bond demand, and bond demand
is interest inelastic, then speculation stabilizes the domestic economy against
these shocks. In the opposite case, speculation is destabilizing.—3—
Second, we consider how central bank intervention can be used to
stabilize domestic income. Introducing the forward market increases the scope
for intervention in two ways. First, the central bank may intervene directly
in the forward market by taking a position in that market. Second, it may use
the forward rate in determining its position in either the spot or forward
market. Indeed, as we show below, the response to the forward rate is a
crucial part of the optimal intervention policy in stabilizing the economy
against foreign disturbances.
While we focus on forward exchange market intervention as a policy
instrument, our analysis is open to another interpretation. Elsewhere (Eaton
and Turnovsky (1983)) we show that when covered interest parity obtains, for-
ward market intervention is equivalent in its effects to sterilized spot mar-
ket intervention. Since our analysis is in fact based upon this interest
parity assumption, our results on optimal forward market intervention can be
interpreted equally as applying to optimal sterilized spot market interven-
tion, while the spot market intervention we consider in this paper is unsterilized.
Section El sets forth the basic model. In Section III the model is
solved for the case where there is no intervention, so that the exchange rate
is perfectly flexible. Here we consider the effects of the elasticity of
speculation on exchange rate, price, and output stability. Section IV intro-
duces central bank intervention into the model, while Section V discusses the
effects of intervention on the stability of output.
II. THEFORWARDEXCHANGE MARKET IN A MODEL OF FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
In this section we shall assume that the exchange rate is perfectly
flexible, so that the domestic monetary authorities abstain from any form of
intervention. The model we develop is a simple one, enabling us to focus on
the main issues without undue complication. Specifically, we assume that there—4—
is a single traded commodity, whose price in terms of foreign currency is
given. Also, we shall assume that the domestic bond is a perfect substitute
for a traded world bond when fully covered against exchange rate risk. Thus
purchasing power parity (PPP) and covered interest parity (CIP) are assumed
to hold. In the concluding section we note how our results extend to the
more general case where domestic and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes.
Our analysis focuses on a small economy which takes the foreign price level
and interest rate as given.
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eS =currentspot exchange rate (measured in terms of units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency)
e =forwardexchange rate (measured in terms of units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency)—5—
m =domesticnominal money supply
y =domesticreal output
r =domesticnominal interest rate
r* =foreignnominal interest rate
h =domesticdemand for bonds
b =domesticnominal supply of bonds
s =speculativedemand for foreign exchange forward
urn =stochasticdisturbance in demand for money
bu =stochasticdisturbance in bond market
u5 =stochasticdisturbance in speculators' demand for foreign
exchange forward
u =stochasticdisturbance in output supply
x =expectationof x conditional on information available at
t+s,t . t+s
time t,x=p,e5.
Allvariablesexcept r and r* are expressed as logarithmic deviations from
steady state levels; r and r* are deviations in natural units. The subscript
refers to the time dimension.
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the domestic price of a freely traded commodity equals the price abroad multi-
plied by the exchange rate. The domestic demand for money is of the usual
form and equilibrium in the domestic money market is described by (ib). We
assume that all domestic money is held by domestic residents, who in turn
hold no foreign money. Equation (ic) specifies covered interest parity and
embodies the assumption that domestic bonds and covered foreign bonds are
perfect substitutes.
Condition (id) specifies the domestic demand for bonds. Because
bond market interacts in a crucial way with the forward market we depart—6—
from the standard practice of specifying a commodity market equilibrium, a
savings or absorption equation, and suppressing the bond market equilibrium
condition. Instead, we explicitly include the bond market and leave savings
to be defined residually from conditions for money market and bond market
equilibrium. This specification is also the most convenient in a log—linear
framework and is frequently invoked in such models; see, e.g., Lucas (1975).
We postulate, in general, that the demand for bonds depends upon real income,
the domestic nominal interest rate, and the anticipated rate of inflation.
While an increase in income is likely to raise the total demand for financial
assets, it will shift the composition of demand toward money. The net effect
on bond demand, and hence the sign of l' is ambiguous. The positive coeffi-
cient on the interest rate, 2' and the negative coefficient on the expected
rate of inflation, -.8, together with the additional restriction —> 0
are readily derived if one assumes that (i) money and bonds are gross substitutes
and (ii) the demand for bonds is more sensitive to its own real rate of return
(rt
— thanto the real rate of return on money —
Thespecification of the forward market is given in equations (le)
and (lf) and can be derived from intertemporal portfolio maximization; see,
e.g., Solnik (1973), Kouri (1976), Fama and Farber (1979), Eaton and Turnovsky
(1981). In our model, this market has two functions. First, it provides
holders of foreign bonds a means of eliminating exchange risk by selling the
foreign currency proceeds of their bonds forward. Such sales constitute
arbitrage activity on this market. Second, the forward market provides a
means of speculating on exchange rateniovements.' A first order approximation
to the rate of return on a forward purchase of one unit of foreign currency
is given by e+i —e.In equation (le) we postulate that the supply of
foreign exchange for speculation, s, is an increasing function of the—7—
expected difference (e+i —e).When speculators are risk neutral, or when
exchange risk is absent, the speculation coefficient will tend to infinity.
In the absence of any official intervention in the forward exchange market,
equilibrium in the forward exchange market requires that the excess demands
for forward exchange for these two purposes sum to zero. This condition is
described by (lf). Because of the assumption that domestic and foreign bonds
are perfect substitutes, there is in fact only a single demand function for
total bonds, h; the demand for foreign bonds is simply the difference between
the aggregate national demand and the supply from domestic sources; that isa'
(2)
where H is the total real bond demand, B is the domestic nominal bond supply,
P is the domestic price, andHdenotes the level of the real demand for foreign
bonds, all expressed in levels. To express this relationship using variables
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where lower case letters denote the logarithmic deviations from steady state
of the corresponding upper case variables and the parameter i. = isthe
average holdings of foreign bonds divided by total bond deinand.-" Since
foreign bonds are covered, forward market equilibrium requires thats =
andequation (lf) follows.
The supply of domestic output is specified by (ig). This relation-
ship postulates that the deviation in output from some fixed capacity level
depends upon the unanticipated component of the current price of domestic
output. This formulation resembles a Lucas (1973) supply function, although
as Flood (1979) has argued, with both international and intranational trading,—8—
this rationale is inappropriate. Rather, it may be justified in terms of
the wage determination model of Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977a).
m b s y Finally, the disturbances Ut, Ut, Ut and u are assumed to have
zero means and finite second moments and to be identically and independently
distributed. The same assumptions are made about the disturbances in the
foreign price level and foreign interest rate, p and r, respectively.2-"
III. THE ROLE OF SPECULATION UNDER PERFECTLY FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
We now solve the model outlined in equations (la)—(lg) under the
assumption that there is no government intervention. We therefore set
=bt
=0for all t, so that domestic nominal money and bond supplies remain
at their constant, steady state levels. Taking conditional expectations of
the system (1) at time t for time t+i (i > 1), we can easily establish that
the rational expectations of future spot exchange rates satisfy the first
order difference equation




Given the above parameter restrictions, the coefficientexceeds unity and
accordingly,the expected exchange rate at time t+i remains bounded as - if
andonly if
(4) =0 for I =1.2, ..., andfor all t
Otherwise, expectations become unbounded and this in turn implies that the
asymptotic variances of the spot rate (and the forward rate) will become
infinite. In order to rule this possibility out, we therefore focus on the
bounded solution given by (4).-" In particular, setting i1 in (4) and
noting the PPP condition, we obtain the relevant expectations—9—
e+i = = 0 for all t
Thus setting e+1 = = 0in (1) implies the following unique
solutions for domestic output, the price level, and the spot and forwardprices
of foreign exchange, in terms of contemporaneous domestic disturbances and
foreign price and interest rate shocks:
(5a) + iy)Ou + [82 + (1 + a2)iy + 2(1 - + 83)Ju
+ 28 + ct2ktye(p+ r) }l
(5b) Pt ={—(82
+ py)u' —F2u+ c2u+
c2i.ty(p+
(5c) e ={(82+ uy)u —F2u+2u -[82++2(l-+
83)+r2e]p
+
(5d) e ={(l —8÷ 83 + 818)u —— (l- + 8) + F1]u + (1+2+








In general, r1, r2, andare ambiguous in sign. The indeterminacy arises if
the income elasticity of the demand for bonds is strongly negative. For
simplicity, and not implausibly, we will assume that if is negative it is
sufficiently close to zero to ensure that r1, r2 andall remain positive.—10—
Equations (5a)—(5d) summarize how the various disturbances impinge
on the domestic economy. Many of these effects are familiar, and we shall
restrict our remarks to those which relate to the existence of the forward
market and to the nature of speculative behavior.2-"
The Effects of Domestic Disturbance
We begin by considering the response of the spot and forward exchange
rates to the three domestic disturbances. An increase in money or bond demand,
or in output, all act to lower the spot rate, while an increase in the
speculative demand for foreign exchange forward has the opposite effect.
Bond demand and speculative disturbances (as reflected in the composite
disturbance u) affect the forward rate in the same direction and in much
greater magnitude, while money demand and output supply shocks have an
ambiguous effect on the forward rate.
The reason why the spot rate reacts to these disturbances as it
does is straightforward, as is the reason why the forward rises in response
to a forward market disturbance. Less obvious is why the direction of the
c -,-.,+- ÷.,- ,.,-. .44.- 1. = 0 fr'SJLLOC'.1 S LLLC .1. 'IL WaA. ¼Li. Ct LC L'.J IL&'JIflJ-.&t&LSS aLat. '.1 L& = O.LPFSJ u.i.SLt34.ULLLC
is ambiguous. The reason is that these disturbances affect the spot exchange
rate and the price level in ways that create opposing effects on the demand
for foreign bonds and hence on the forward rate. A positive money demand
or output supply shock, by lowering the price level, raises the real supply
of domestic bonds. By lowering the spot exchange rate, however, these shocks
act, via CIP, to raise the nominal interest rate and hence the total demand
for bonds. The net effect on foreign bond demand is therefore ambiguous.
When the share of domestic bonds in total bonds held (1 —p) islarge and
the interest rate response of bond demand —3)is small, the supply—11—
effect is more likely to dominate: positive money demand and output supply
shocks, by reducing the demand for foreign bonds, reduce the supply of foreign
exchange forward as forward cover. The forward rate is consequently higher.
Conversely when the interest response of bond demand (82 —83) islarge
relative to the share of domestic bonds in total bonds held (1 —ji).In
the case 810, the sign of either response is given by (1 —1.1 — 8)where
8 —
83)can be interpreted as the semi—elasticity of the demand
for bonds with respect to the nominal interest rate, given a constant real
interest rate)&" An implication of these results is that, if the share of
domestic bonds is large and bond demand is interest inelastic (in this
sense), the forward rate may react in the opposite direction from the spot
rate to a shock in the domestic money demand or output supply. Of course,
in the extreme case in which speculation is perfectly elastic (y -a'),the
forward rate equals the expected future spot rate (shown previously to be
zero) and is unaffected by any current, temporary disturbances.
Because of PPP the effect of domestic disturbances on the price
level is the same as that on the spot rate. The sign of the effect on output
is also the same with respect to money demand and forward market disturbances,
while the effect of output supply disturbances is reversed.
The Effects of Foreign Disturbances
As with domestic shocks, when speculation is perfectly elastic the
forward rate is unaffected by current foreign shocks. So is domestic output
and the domestic price level when the demand for money is interest inelastic
(ci2 = 0). In general, an increase in the foreign price level p* will, via
PPP, lower the spot rate, thereby increasing the domestic interest rate.
If this has no effect on the demand for money (a2 = 0), e will move to of f—
set completely the effect of the change in p on p. Otherwise, the demand—12—
for money will fall, raising Pt and y to maintain money market equilibrium.
An increase in the foreign interest rate r*t will, via CIP, raise the domestic
interest rate. If a2 =0there are no further effects on e, or
Otherwise, the induced increase in the demand for money will cause these
three variables to increase.
The Role of Speculation
Another issue we consider is how the stability of the small economy
is affected by speculative behavior. To do this we analyze how the magnitudes
of the responses of the endogenous variablesto changes in the exogenous random
variables are affected by changes in the coefficient y, which measures the
elasticity of speculation with respect to the risk premium. In effect, this
involves examining the cross partial derivatives
3Iz/axI/y, z = e, e;
Y in * * =u,U, u,r
From (5a)—(5d) several qualitative propositions follow:
Proposition 1: An increase in the elasticity of speculation
stabilizes the forward exchange rate against all random
disturbances.
As speculation becomes more elastic, the forward rate becomes more
closely tied to the spot rate expected to prevail in the subsequent period
and less responsive to current shocks.
Proposition 2: An increase in the elasticity of speculation
stabilizes the spot exchange rate against forward market
disturbances and foreign price disturbances. It destabilizes—13—
the spot rate against foreign interest rate disturbances.
More elastic speculation stabilizes or destabilizes the
spot rate against domestic money demand and output supply
disturbances according to whether these disturbances have
a negative or positive effect on the forward rate. In
the case of a monetary disturbance, the relevant condition is
(6) l—i—+OO
in the case of a supply disturbance, it is given by
(7) a1(1 —
— — (1+ a2)1 0
Thus more elastic speculation is more likely to stabilize against
domestic monetary and supply disturbances when bond demand is interest
elastic and the share of domestic bonds held is small. The converse applies
when bond demand is interest inelastic and the share of domestic bonds is
large.
To interpret these results we consider first the domestic disturbances.
As speculation becomes more elastic, the disturbance u, which impinges on
forward market equilibrium, is accommodated by offsetting speculation. Asy
approaches infinity, the condition for forward market equilibrium reduces to
e =e+1,so that u becomes irrelevant. The case of monetary and supply
disturbances is more complicated. Positive money demand and output supply
disturbances initially create an excess demand for money. A lower spot rate
restores equilibrium by: Ci) lowering the price level via PPP, thereby rais-
ing the real money supply; (ii) lowering real output via the supply function;
and (iii) raising the nominal interest rate via CIP. To the extent that
speculation ties the forward rate to the future spot rate, the forward—14—
rate changes by less in response to a current shock. If a positive money
demand or output supply shock raises the forward rate then a smaller change
in the spot rate is required to restore equilibrium, since the higher forward
rate raises, via CIP, the interest rate and lowers money demand. Speculation,
by tying the forward rate more to the future, reduces the amount by which the
forward rate rises. Consequently a larger change in the spot rate is needed.
Speculation therefore destabilizes. Conversely, when these shocks act to
lower the forward rate the excess supply of money is exacerbated. A larger
spot rate change is needed to equilibrate the money market. Speculation
now stabilizes by tying down the forward rate, preventing it from falling
as far as before.ii
Consider now the case of foreign disturbances. A rise in the
foreign price level p raises the domestic price level via PPP, thereby
creating an excess demand for money (both because the real money supply falls
and income rises). A fall in the spot rate restores equilibrium for the three
reasons given above. The forward rate falls in response to a positive value
of p. The less the forward rate falls in response to the rise in p the
more a given fall in the spot rate raises the interest rate, via CI?. Con-
sequently, the more speculation ties the forward rate to the expected future
spot rate the more responsive is the nominal interest rate to the spot rate. A
smaller change in e is thus required to restore money market equilibrium.
A rise in the foreign interest rate r also affects money market equilibrium,
in this case through CIP. Now, however, a change in e acts to dampen the
effect on money demand, since it offsets the effects of the change in r on
the domestic interest rate. As y rises, e is less sensitive, so that now
a larger change in e is required.—15-
Proposition 3: An increase In the elasticity of specula-
tion stabilizes the domestic price level against forward
market disturbances but destabilizes it against foreign
interest rate and price level disturbances. More elastic
speculation stabilizes or destabilizes the price level
against domestic money demand disturbances according to
condition (6) and against domestic output supply dis-
turbances according to condition (7).
To the extent that speculation stabilizes the spot rate, through
PPP it stabilizes the domestic price level given the foreign price level.
Hence, the responses of Pt and e to all shqcks except p are affected by
speculation in the same direction. In the case of foreign price level shocks,
S .. ... S however,movements in e stabilize p. By stabilizing e against p an increase
in the elasticity of speculation destabilizesPt.
Proposition 4: An Increase in the elasticity of speculation
stabilizes domestic output against forward market dis-
turbances but destabilizes it against foreign interest
rate and foreign price level disturbances. More elastic
speculation stabilizes or destabilizes output against money
demand disturbances according to condition (6) and against
domestic output supply disturbances according to the converse
of condition (7).
Except for domestic supply disturbances, any effect which an increased
elasticity of speculation has on income is qualitatively the same as its effect
on the domestic price level. The exception arises because of an increase in
u acts to raise the demand for money, lowering p. The drop in Pt dampens—16—
the increase in y originating from the disturbance u. When speculation
reduces the responsiveness of Pt to u, it diminishes this dampening effect,
and conversely.
IV. INTERVENTION POLICIES
We now relax the assumption of a perfectly flexible exchange rate
and assume instead that the domestic monetary authorities continually inter-
vene in both the spot and forward exchange markets. In specifying the inter-
vention rules it is important to observe that the term b can be interpreted
either as a percentage change in the nominal bond supply or as government
sales of foreign exchange forward as a percentage of government debt. To
see this equivalence note that, expressed in terms of levels, forward mar-
ket equilibrium is described by
H -= S+
where G denotes government purchases of foreign exchange forward. Define the
parameter g as the nominal value in domestic currency units of these commitments,
expressed as a share of outstanding bonds, i.e.,
gEG/B
Substituting gB for EG in the forward market equilibrium condition and taking a
log linear approximation, as before, gives
(le') h = + (1 —11)(b+ —
Inderiving (le') we assume that the share is sufficiently small to allow
the approximation ln(l + = Theterms b and g enter only equation (le')
additively and nowhere else in the model. Accordingly, variations in the bond
supply and in the government's forward market position do not have linearly
independent effects on the economy. For concreteness we focus on the forward
market position as a policy instrument, setting b =O'—17—
To incorporate official intervention into the analysis requires only
a modest modification to the basic model (la)—(lg). Specifically, we replace
the forward market equilibrium condition (le) by (le') and append policy rules
describing the intervention in the spot and forward markets, with all other
relationships remaining unchanged. The rules we consider are hypothesized to




These are direct generalizations of the types of rules specified in the current
intervention literature, which typically postulate policies that makethe
13/
domestic money supply vary with the current spot exchange rate.— Here we
assume that the intensity of intervention in both the spot and forward markets
depends upon both the spot and forward exchange rates and are described by the
parameters a1, a2, b1, b2. We may note from these intervention rules that a
fixed exchange rate may be attained either by lettinga1 -— orb1 -
Thesolution of the system for given arbitrary intervention parameters
can be obtained by first substituting the intervention rules (lh) and (li) into
the system (la)—(lg) (with (le') replacing (le)) and then following the procedure
outlined in the previous section. As before, by taking conditional expectations
of the modified system we find that the expectations of future spot exchange
rates satisfy a first order difference equation analogous to (3), namely
(3') e* =
t+i+1,t t+i,t
Thecoefficient 'isa function of the intervention parameters
a1, a2, b1, b2 as
well as the parameters describing private sector behavior. Indeed in the
absence of any intervention q'4. In the case that f4'J >1,then as before,
the only bounded solution is for =0.However, with active intervention
it is now possible for < 1.Such a case will arise, for example, if—18—
a11 +2,b1 =1—2I(l
—u). Underthese conditions, the requirement that
expectations be bounded and the equivalent restriction that the asymptotic
variance of the spot rate be finite imposes no restriction on The
solutions for e+i and therefore for e are non—unique and other, stronger
criteria are required to determine the solution.
One procedure, suggested by Taylor (1977), involves imposing the
requirement that the arbitrary constantin the solution to (3') be chosen to
minimize the asymptotic variance of e. However, this procedure is essentially
arbitrary since there is no obvious mechanism to ensure that the variance will
be minimized in this way. Also, the value of the constant that minimizes the
asymptotic variance of the spot exchange rate is not the same as the one that
minimizes the asymptotic variance of the price level. The question of which
variance (if any) rational expectations do actually minimize is not clear)-'
In the present analysis we shall adopt a simpler (but equally arbitrary)
argument to determine e+1. We shall simply assume that irrespective of
whether 1, the rational expectations generates a solution for e which
is based on the minimum amount of information. It can be shown that if
0 and < 1the stochastic process determining e depends upon
an infinite distributed lag of past disturbances; for > 1it depends only
upon current disturbances. Applying the minimum information argument requires
us to set e÷j =0for all 4',inwhich case e depends only upon current
disturbances. This approach also has the related advantage of ensuring the
continuity of the optimal policy about the point where J'= 1and avoiding
some of the complications associated with the minimum variance criterion
noted in footnote 14. Thus setting all expectations to zero in the modified
system, the solutions for the endogenous variables can be obtained in a form
directly analogous to (5a)—(Sd).—19—
V.OPTIMAL INTERVENTION
Weturn now to the question of the optimal degree of interven-
tion. The typical approach to this problem is to minimize some objective
function expressed in terms of the asymptotic variances of the endogenous
variables in the economy. The objective function most frequently
postulated, and the one we shall adopt, is the stabilization of income.
The solution for income derived in the previous section is given by
y =(—8[2+ iy— b2(l—M)ju+O(a2+a2)u
(8)
+[(a2+a2)[3 —2+(l—.i)(l—b1)]+ (l+a2—a1)[2 ÷111 — b2(l—ii)]}u
+O[cx2[py —b2(l—i.i)]
—a221r
+ O[(ct2—a1)[i.iy+ 2 —b2(l—ii)]
—
(cL2+a2)[2+ b1(l—i.i)]]p}
where D E(l+6a1+a2—a1)[].Ly+ —
b(l—u)1
+(a2+a2)[3 — + + (l—i.i)(1—b1)]
In principle, the optimal degrees of intervention a1, a2, b1, b2, can be
obtained by first calculating the variance of y, say, and then minimizing
with respect to these four parameters. This yields four independent values
for the intervention parameters which are functions of the random variables
and their covariances. Given the complexity of y, to determine the optimal
policies in this way turns out to be extremely cumbersome and not very
enlightening. In addition, tractability would require that all the parameters
of the model be treated as constants. We have shown elsewhere (see Eaton
and Turnovsky (1981)) that the elasticity of speculation depends, among
other things, on the variance of the spot exchange rate. Since different
intervention rules imply different asymptotic variances of the exchange
rate, -y is implicitly a function of the intervention parameters. Strictly
speaking, this dependence needs to be taken into account in the derivation of
the optimum.—20--
Thus, rather than pursuing an explicit optimization, we focuson the
optimal intervention with respect to the different random variables, taken
individually, and also grouped as domestic and foreign disturbances. This
approach enables us to determine the extent to which (sets of) disturbances
may be eliminated and does not require us to treat y as a constant.
To facilitate the economic understanding of the optimal policies we
shall obtain, it is convenient to summarize the system (7b), (la)—(ld), (le'),
(lf)—(li) in the following way.
s f s f s m (9a) aie +a2et








where we have substituted the intervention rules (lh), (ii) into the appropriate
market clearing conditions, and used PPP to eliminate the price level. Follow—
ing the argument of Section IV, the expectations variables e+i,1,t-1. have
been set to zero. These three equations thus describe money market equilibrium,
forward exchange market equilibrium, and the domestic output supply function,
respectively.
We now discuss how intervention can be used to eliminate disturbances
of different types:
5.1. Domestic Monetary and Speculative Disturbances
Suppose that the only random disturbance is in the domestic demand for
money, u. Then from (8) it can be seen that output can be stabilized exactly
in any one of the following four ways' (i) a1 --—; (ii)a2 --
(iii)b1 —;(iv)b2 =(2+y)/(l—i.i).Setting either a1 --— orb1 ÷—
leadsto fixing the spot rate. Given purchasing power parity, the domestic
price level is fixed and given that there are no disturbances impinging on
supply, domestic output must be fixed as well; see (9c). Suppose on the other—21—
hand that the monetary authority intervenes with infinite intensity in the
spot market in response to the forward rate, setting a2 -— Thiswill fix
the forward rate e. It then follows that the spot rate e and outputy are
jointly determined by the forward market (9b) and the domestic stability func-
tion (9c). Since both these relationships are independent of the monetary
disturbance both e and y are therefore fixed; in particular, output is
stabilized perfectly as before. Finally, we may note that if b2 =(2+i.iy)/(l)
the effects of the forward rate are eliminated from the forward market equilibrium
(9b). Substituting this value of b2 into (9b), it is seen from (9b) and (9c)
that e is now fixed and again output is stabilized perfectly.
Disturbances in speculation u can be stabilized analogously by
setting either (i) a1 -—, (ii)a2 2' (iii) b1 —;(iv)b2 --— anda
similar explanation can be given.
Note that all policies which eliiainate these two disturbances involve,
directly or indirectly, fixing e. Thus the established result that fixed
exchange rates isolate the domestic economy from domestic monetary shocks (see,
e.g., Boyer (1978), Turnovsky (1983), Buiter and Eaton (1980)) extends to
speculative shocks as well. The central bank can, however, stabilize e by
forward market intervention (or sterilized spot market intervention) as well as
by direct (unsterilized) intervention in the spot market. Furthermore, when
e5 is fixed, y is likely to be large which, fromproposition (iv) above, rein-
forces the stabilizing effects of intervention when shocks are speculative.
5.2. Domestic Supply Disturbances
To stabilize disturbances originating in the supply of domestic ouput
it a little more complicated. This requires setting the coefficient of u in (8)
to zero. Any combination of coefficients a1, a2, b1, b2 satisfying the relationship
(2+a2) (83—82+(l—) (1—b1)) =(l+a2—a1)(2-h.iy—b2(l--.i))—22—
with the exception of b2 =(2+iiy)I(l_u)and a2 =
cz2will do. This special
case eliminates the forward rate e from both the money market and forward
market equilibrium conditions. In effect, the spot rate e is required to
equilibrate both markets and the system is overdeterinined. Two simple inter—
vention rules which do succeed in stabilizing income exactly against this
type of disturbance are:(1) a11 + a2, a2 =—a2;(ii) a1 =1+a2,
b1 =1+(83—2)/(1—p).The first of these policies involves intervening in the spot
market alone; by increasing the domestic money supply appropriately in response
to a depreciation in the spot rate and decreasing it appropriately in response
to a depreciation in the forward rate, e, e and the random influences they
embody can be eliminated from the money market, thereby stabilizing income
exactly. The second policy rules require intervention in both the spot and for-
ward exchange markets; the domestic money supply should again be increased
appropriately in response to a depreciation of the spot rate, although this
should now be accompanied by an adjustment (which may be either positive or
negative) in the domestic monetary authority's holdings of forward exchange.
In economic terms, setting a1 =1eliminates the spot rate from the money
demand function, while setting b1 =1+ (3—82)/(l_.1) eliminates the spot
rate from the foreign exchange market. Thus output and the forward rate become
jointly determined by the money market and forward market equilibrium condi-
tions. Since these are free of stochastic disturbances output and the forward
rate remain fixed, pegging output at zero.
In the case of domestic monetary or speculative disturbances, income
can be stabilized perfectly by adopting the traditional form of intervention, namely
unsterilized intervention through the money market in response to the spot rate
alone. With respect to domestic supply shocks this is no longer true. Complete
stabilization requires either: (i) an appropriate response to the forward rate
either through money market or forward market intervention; or (ii) an appropriate
response to the spot rate through forward market intervention.—23—
5.3. Domestic Disturbances as a Group
Next we consider the question of whether or not it is possible to
stabilize domestic income exactly against all the domestic disturbances
simultaneously. Given that there are only three disturbances and that there
are four policy parameters to be chosen this might seem possible. But in fact
it is infeasible. Let us consider the alternatives. First, wemust eliminate
u and u. One possibility would appear to be to set b2 =
a2
=
—a2.But as we have noted in connection with the supply disturbance u
this combination of intervention parameters involves the elimination of the
forward exchange rate from both the money market and forward exchange market
and leads to an inconsistency. The only alternatives are therefore to eliminate
these random variables by pegging the exchange rate by setting eithera1 -
orb1 ÷-. Ineither case, this yields
yt =
sothat domestic supply disturbances are fully reflected in domesticoutput. In
effect, the introduction of a fixed exchange rate means that the possibility of
stabilization through the forward market is lost. Alternatively, the policies
which may eliminate u will not succeed in eliminating both u and usimultaneously.
By choosing a1 =1+ a2, a2 =—a2it is possible to stabilize both u and
but it is not possible to stabilize exactly for u1 and u taken together. In
short, there is no way of stabilizing against all three domestic random dis-
turbances simultaneously. It is possible to stabilize against u, u and u, u
pairwise, but this cannot be achieved for the remaining pair ut and u.
5.4. Foreign Disturbances
We turn now to the foreign disturbances, which impinge on the domestic
economy through the foreign price level and interest rate. From (8) it is seen






(lOb) + 1.11— b2(l—.1)](cL2—a1) —(a2+a2)[2+ b1(l—p)] =0
will stabilize domestic output exactly. There are an infinite number of com-
binations which will achieve this, although in all cases the intervention rule
must respond to the forward rate; see (lOa). 1n important result worth high-
lighting is that perfect stabilization can be attained by intervening in either
the forward market or the spot market alone. The optimal intervention parameters





Ineither case, the intervention rule involves accommodating the forward rate;
the movement of the spot rate is irrelevant.
To understand the economic intuition underlying these policy rules,
let us substitute (lla) into the system described by (9a)—(9c) at the same time
setting all domestic disturbances to zero, to yield
(9a') —(p+e) =a1y
—c2(r+e—e)
(9b') + 2[r + e —ej+ [3 + (l—)}(p+e) =0
(9c') y =
Inspecting(9a')—(9c'), it is evident that if the intervention is through the
forward market in accordance with (ha), the equilibrium conditions for the
domestic economy reduce to r + e —e0, p + e =0, =0.In particular,
any random increase in the foreign price level must be exactly offset by an
equivalent appreciation of the domestic spot rate, leaving real output fixed.
When intervention takes place through the spot market in accordance
with (llb), the system becomes—25--
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Inthis case the intervention rule offsets the effect of movements in the
domestic nominal interest rate on money demand. Again the proportionality of
domestic output and the domestic price level ensures that output must remain
fixed.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper we have developed a stochastic model of a small open
economy having both a forward and a spot market for foreign exchange. Two main
issues have been addressed. These are (i) to determine the extent to which
speculation is stabilizing; (ii) to characterize income stabilizing interven-
tion rules in the spot and forward markets.
Whether or not speculation is stabilizing depends upon the origin of
the random disturbances and certain characteristics of the bond market. Specula—
-4,i 1r ar-i1it', fncf fI-ira ,4t-,—1-. — '.._ I_LLL
initiallyon the bond and forward markets. By contrast, it tends to destabilize
domestic income and the domestic price level against those disturbances originat-
ing from abroad. Whether or not speculation stabilizes the economy against
shocks in domestic money demand or output supply depends largely on the share of
foreign bonds in total bond holdings, as well as on the interest sensitivity
of aggregate domestic bond demand. If the foreign bond share is large and
bond demand is highly elastic, speculation is likely to stabilize the price
level against both types of shocks. Conversely, if domestic bonds dominate
and bond demand is interest inelastic, speculation is likely to destabilize
the price level against these shocks as well.—26—
In analyzing intervention in the foreign exchange market, we have
not found it fruitful to derive explicit optimal policies for the general
case, although in principle this could be done. Rather we have focused on
the separate disturbances, both individually and in groups, and considered
policies which may insulate domestic real income against them. We have
shown how real income can be stabilized against any single domestic random
disturbance in a variety of ways, although despite the fact that we are free
to choose four independent intervention parameters, it is impossible to
stabilize against all three domestic random variables simultaneously. In some
but not all cases, pairs of these random disturbances can be stabilized per
fectly. By contrast, an infinite range of intervention policies exist for
stabilizing the foreign disturbances. In all cases, the intervention rule
must take account of the forward exchange rate, thus highlighting the importance
of the forward market in stabilization. However, although the rule must be
responsive to the forward rate, the intervention itself may take place either
through the spot market or through the forward market. Equivalently, SpOt
market intervention may be sterilized or unsterilized.
Finally, we may note that for analytical convenience we have con-
ducted our analysis for the limiting case where domestic bonds and foreign
covered bonds are perfect substitutes. It is straightforward to relax this
assumption and allow them to be imperfect substitutes. En that case it can
be shown that the general propositions obtained in this paper, and which we
have just summarized, continue to hold.FOOTNOTES
1.Important exceptions are the papers by Tsiang (1959) and Day (1976,
1977). Both authors consider intervention in the partial equilibrium
context of the foreign exchange market. They do not consider inter-
vention as a tool of stabilization policy, wñich is our purpose here.
2. The more recent formal analyses of the relative stability of fixed
versus flexible exchange rates (e.g., Turnovsky (1976), Fisher (1977b),
Flood (1979)) abstract entirely from speculative capital movements.
3. Bilson (1978) does incorporate a forward market into his analysis, but
does not consider intervention in this market. Furthermore, he assumes
that speculation in the forward market brings the forward rate into
equality with the expectation of the spot rate prevailing when the
forward contract matures. Optimal speculative behavior derived from
portfolio maximization models implies that this assumption is generally
valid only when agents are risk neutral or when there is no exchange
risk; see, for example, Solnik (1973), Kouri (1976), Adler and Dumas
(1977), Eaton (1978), Eaton and Turnovsky (1980).
4. We find it analytically convenient to separate forward market participa-
tion into pure speculation and pure arbitrage. We implicitly treat the
acquisition of an amount x of uncovered foreign bonds as combining a
covered investment of x in foreign bonds and a speculative purchase of
foreign currency forward in amount x. In a portfolio model of foreign
investment we identify a third motive for participating in the forward
market as hedging against domestic inflation. Forward positions for
hedging purposes depend upon the relative variability of the domestic
and foreign price levels and do not respond to the variables we are
concerned with here. We may thus treat the forward position due to
hedging as a constant absorbed in St; see Eaton and Turnovsky (1981).
5.The domestic bond market equilibrium condition is based on the assumption
that foreigners hold zero stocks of domestic bonds. In Eaton and Turnovsky
(1981) we show that this is more likely to arise when the domestic price
level is more sensitive to the exchange rate than is the foreign price
level. Note we assume (i) that money and bonds are both outside assets
and (ii) that the money and bonds of each country are denominated in the
currency of that country. Frankel (1979) discusses the relevance of these
assumptions for our specification.
6. This approximation is obtained as follows
(HtrB cT-I Ici ___-
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where x =inX. Thus we may write
ht =(b-p)+(l-)h
7. A more complete analysis would derive the foreign disturbances r and
as they impinge upon the small country we consider here, from under-
lying money market, bond market, and output disturbances abroad. To do
so requires that we specify a model of the rest of the world which may
be used to relate r and p to these underlying disturbances abroad. Since
ttiiSapproachintroduces a number of complications which do not
illuminate the issues we consider here, we do not pursue it. See
Turnovsky (1983) for a model of optimal intervention that does follow
this textendedu small country approach.
8. This requirement that the asymptotic variance be finite may be justi-
fied by appealing to some appropriate transversality condition for a
corresponding model derived from optimizing behavior. Under appropriate
conditions this requirement also imposes boundedness on price expectations.
9. The effects of various exogenous stochastic disturbances on the domestic
economy and how these are influenced by the degree of speculative
behavior are also considered by Driskill and McCafferty (1980, 1982)
and Turnovsky and Bhandari (1982). These models differ in many critical
respects from the analysis presented here. For example, the Driskill—
McCafferty model is much more partial equilibrium, while the Turnovsky—
Bhandari analysis does not formulate the forward market explicitly.
10. The reason and and henceare semi—elasticities is that r and
—pare in percentage change terms, while the demand for bonds
is exresse in logarithms. To see the interpretation ofwrite the




Note that the function can also be written as
ht = +23t+l,t -Pt'÷ 2k- (-r)] +
inwhich casehas an analogous interpretation with respect to infla-
tionary expectations.
11. The following more formal argument may be given. Substituting for p and
in the money market equilibrium and noting (4), we can easily shoi
s f
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<0nd hence we obtain -- <0.It thus
follows that increased speculation causes the fall in the spot rate to increase
and hence is destabilizing. The argument is reversed if ae/ax >0.—F3—
12. The consequences of forward market intervention for the consolidated
balance sheet of the fiscal authority and central bankare discussed
in the Appendix.
13. See, e.g., Cox (1980) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980), for example.
14. Elsewhere, in a related analysis, Turnovsky (1980) has applied this
procedure for determining the stochastic process, with the minimization
of the one—period variance of the spot rate as the criterion.This turns
out to make the subsequent determination of the optimal interventionpolicy
rather complicated. Essentially one has to consider thetwo cases:
(i) > 1,(ii) 14'J< 1separately, and ensure that the optimal policy
in each case is consistent with the restrictions applicable to that case.
The overall optimum is obtained by taking the superior of these two
cases and also involves a consideration of the boundary cases.
15.Sinceas noted above, y is in principle a function of the intervention
parameters, we must have y =y(a1,a2, b ,b2).Thus in case (iv) the





=0,b == y(0,0, 0, b2). The same comment applies to
oher cases where teoptimum policy involves relating an optimal inter-
vention parameter to y.APPENDIX
BALANCE SHEET CONSTRAINTS ON CENTRAL BANKINTERVENTIONIN
THE SPOT AND FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKETS
In Sections IV and Vofthe text we allow the central bank to
establisha money supply and a forward market position in response to the
spot and forward exchange rates. In this appendix we state the balance
sheet constraint incumbent on the central bank in engaging in these
activities and then state the assumptions about central bank actions
implicit in our equations (lh) and (ii).
The central bank, we assume, holds as assets government bonds and
foreign reserves and issues, as liabilities, money. By making forward market
commitments the central bank also earns capital gains and losses which it
mayfinanceby monetary issue or by varying its holdings of foreign reserves
or government bonds. Let Gt_l denote central bank purchases (in natural
units) of foreign exchange forward in period t—l. This purchase has no
implications for the central bank's balance sheet in period t—l. In period
t, however, if, say, E >E1and Gtl <0,the central bank must deliver
an amount G1 of foreign currency at a cost—EG_1. In exchange it receives
—E .,G of domestic money. If it buys G •inthe spot market for foreign exchange
then there is a net increase in the money supply of —(E —Ei)Gti.Instead
it could buy only _ElGt_l in the spat market and reduce its reserve holdings by
—(E —E_i)Gt...i,thereby not affecting the domestic money supply. Alternatively,
it could sterilize the effect on the money supply by selling —(E —Ei)Gt_i
in








where Rt denotes the central banks holdings of foreign reserves in period t,
B its holdings of government bonds, and M its outstanding monetary liabilities,
all measured in natural units.-A2 -





where denotes the foreign central bank's reserve holdings. En equations
(lh) and (ii) we assume that the central bank sets a money stock and establishes
a forward market position independently. Implicit is the assumption that the
central bank finances money supply changes and forward market gains and
losses by varying its reserve holdings or its holdings of government bonds.
The effect of changes in the foreign central bank's reserve holdings is
offset by the same means.
We assume that the consequences of any central bank action for
the bond supply are offset by appropriate taxes and transfers by the
domestic fiscal authority. Since we consider a small economy we may ignore
the effects of changes in domestic reserve holdings for the foreign money
supply. Alternatively we could assume that these changes are offset by
appropriate taxes and transfers abroad.
Finally, the behavioral relationships we postulate assume implicitly
that private agents, in their own behavior, are not affected by the central
bank's portfolio position. For instance, a private individual does not
include the central bank's reserve holding as a component of his own wealth.REFERENCES
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